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In recent years Congress has requested numerous studies from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) regarding the status of both
private and public-state and local-pension systems, perhaps because it
fears that under-funded pension plans, private and public alike, might come
with hat in hand to the federal government someday soon.1 Congress is not
alone in worrying, as Governors, 2 state legislators, 3 special state investiga-
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, May 2012. 1 thank William Birdthistle and
David Franklin for their helpful comments and insights, as well as Clarence and Frieda Bayer for
sharing their actuarial and accounting knowledge of pension plans.
1. See, e.g., Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives, BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES at Highlights, 19 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08l162t.pdf [hereinafter PBGC IMPROVEMENTS] (noting that as of
2008, the GAO had conducted ten reviews of the PBGC since 2003 and that PBGC officials had testi-
fied twenty times before various congressional committees since 2002); testimony before the Special
Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: FINANCIAL CHALLENGES HIGHLIGHT NEED FOR
IMPROVED GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT at Highlights (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09702t.pdf [hereinafter PBGC FINANCIAL]; testimony before Senator
Charles E. Grassley, BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND LONG-TERM INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES HAVE EVOLVED GRADUALLY AS PLANS TAKE ON INCREASED INVESTMENT RISK 1 (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0754.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNANCE PRACTICES] (dis-
cussing the state of public defined benefit plans). In fact, in one study, the Government Accountability
Office looked at a sample of about seventy public retirement systems at the request of Senators Max
Baucus, Democrat of Montana, and Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, the chairman and ranking
Republican member of the Finance Committee at that time, respectively. Mary Williams Walsh, Report
to Senators Says Many States Are Lax in Funding Their Pension Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/business/29pension.html. The two senators wanted to increase
monitoring of public pension plans because they did not "want a fund collapsing and looking to the
federal government for a bailout." Id. (quoting Senator Baucus and noting that the request was some-
what unusual, because Congress has little authority over the way states handle their pension funds).
2. E.g., Arnold Schwarzenegger, Public Pensions and Our Fiscal Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575449813071709510.html (Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger of California).
3. E.g., Dan Balz, N.J. Gov. Chris Christie Opens NGA Meeting with Censure of Public-sector




tors,4 non-governmental organizations, 5 businesses, 6 academics,7 and the
media8 have spoken out about the looming pension problems in the United
States. Pension under-funding even reached the national election stage in
2010, with candidates across the country offering a variety of proposals to
strengthen pension financing.9
This concern certainly seems warranted given the fact that the SEC re-
cently sued New Jersey, the first time the agency has ever sued a state for
securities fraud, because of the way New Jersey has been funding its pen-
sion system.' 0 From 2001 to 2007, New Jersey allegedly "misrepresented
and failed to disclose material information" about the under-funding of its
pension plans while issuing $26 billion in bonds."I The state used those
bonds to raise pension benefits 9 percent for state and local government
employees.12 Someday, New Jersey's liabilities will reach a tipping point
where the state will have to choose between repaying the bonds it has is-
sued or honoring its pension obligations; it will not be able to do both.13
4. E.g., S.F. CIVIL GRAND JURY, PENSION TSUNAMI: THE BILLION DOLLAR BUBBLE 2,4 (2010),
available at http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2660 (San
Francisco's Civil Grand Jury).
5. E.g., ADAM B. SUMMERS, How CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM BROKE (AND How
TO Fix IT) 1-2 (2010), available at http://reason.org/files/califomia pension-crisis reform study.pdf
(Reason Foundation).
6. E.g., E.S. Browning, Pension Funds Flee Stocks in Search of Less-Risky Bets, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 16, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704540904575451793471885092.html.
7. E g., Jeannette Neumann et al., Stressed States are Forcing Workers to Retire Later, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 2, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703314904575399713055177750.html (Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College).
8. E g., Balz, supra note 3 (Washington Post staff writer).
9. Stephen C. Fehr, Pensions Become a Heated Issue in 2010 Politics, STATELINE, Oct. 1, 2010,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentld=5 17581.
10. New Jersey eventually settled the case without admitting or denying wrongdoing. Kara




11. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, The SEC's Jersey Score, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI0001424052748704476104575439431857019668.html (quoting the
SEC).
12. Id. New Jersey did this by reducing the divisor in its benefit calculations from sixty to fifty-
five. Terrence Dopp, Christie Proposes Rolling Back 2001 New Jersey Pension Benefits Increase,
BLOOMBERG, Sept. 14, 2010, 2:04 PM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-14/christie-
proposes-higher-health-costs-cutting-new-jersey-pension-payouts.html.
13. The City of Vallejo is dealing with this problem right now and chose to stop paying its bond-
holders before it cut back on its pension plans. Ed Mendel, Vallejo Plans to Exit Bankruptcy by Next
Fall, CALPENSIONS, Nov. 1, 2010, http://calpensions.com/2010/11/01/vallejo-plans-to-exit-bankruptcy-
by-next-fall/ (Vallejo chose not to cut pension benefits); Alison Vekshin & Michael B. Marois, Bank-
rupt Vallejo, California, Weighs Five-Year Fiscal Plan to Restructure, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2010,
8:42 AM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-ll-17/bankrupt-vallejo-california-weighs-five-year-
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Unfortunately, New Jersey is not the only state struggling with its
pension system, nor are pension problems limited to the public sector. De-
fined benefit retirement plans, which place the burden of providing retire-
ment benefits on employers, are putting an enormous strain on both states
and private companies alike. Only one state-Arkansas in 1934-has de-
faulted on its general obligation pension bonds since the 1800s, 14 but un-
less action is taken, the current national and global economic situation, the
poor decisions made by state and local governments concerning their re-
tirement plans, and the imminent wave of Baby Boomer retirements threat-
en to push the United States' economy to the brink of insolvency.
This Note begins in Part I by examining relevant background infor-
mation regarding defined benefit pension plans and demographic data of
the Baby Boomer generation. Part II explores how states and private em-
ployers have created contractual obligations through defined benefit plans
and examines the magnitude of the financial burden those obligations have
created. Part III addresses what happens when those contractual obligations
are breached, but suggests that litigation cannot provide a complete solu-
tion to pension under-funding. Finally, Part IV discusses and evaluates
some of the options public and private pension systems have to combat
potential disaster, while recommending linking retirement ages to average
life expectancies and enforcing actuarial reductions based on early retire-
ments as especially effective in combating the financial burden of Baby
Boomer retirements. Additionally, although this Note addresses problems
in both the private and public sectors, it focuses more heavily on potential
solutions for public pension plans, based on the regulatory constraints that
are already in place for private companies' pension plans.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS AND BABY
BOOMER DEMOGRAPHICS
The current strains on private and public pension systems in the Unit-
ed States have been influenced by both the structure of our pension plans,
as well as the number of workers who rely on those plans. As explained
below, the use of defined benefit plans-as opposed to defined contribution
plans-poses particular problems. Compounding these problems are the
demographics of the Baby Boomer generation, a large group that will soon
rely on pensions for retirement funding.
fiscal-plan-to-restructure.html (Vallejo has not paid its bondholders since May 2009 and is not planning
to resume payments until 2013).




A. Defined Benefit Plans
A traditional "defined benefit pension plan" is one that promises to
pay an employee a benefit under a fixed formula that "takes into account
factors such as final salary and years of service with the employer." 5 A
common example of a defined benefit formula specifies that at retirement
an employee will receive an annual income equal to a percentage of her
average salary times the number of years she worked for her employer.16
Employees are thus guaranteed a specific benefit at their normal retirement
age, which is usually sixty-five.17 Post-retirement cost of living adjust-
ments (COLAs), which typically attempt to offset inflation, are frequently
included in defined benefit plans.' 8 These plans traditionally disburse a
retiree's retirement payments on a monthly basis until the participant's
death, often with the payments continuing at a reduced level to the retiree's
surviving spouse.19 The employer generally makes the contributions to the
plan, although employee contributions are sometimes required. 20
In contrast, defined contribution plans often require employers to con-
tribute a specified amount, usually a percentage of an employee's annual
salary, to an individual account for each employee, at which point the em-
ployer's obligation to fund the employee's pension plan is complete. 21 In
fact, most defined contribution plans do not include COLAs. 22 Thus, a
defined contribution plan guarantees an input, while a defined benefit plan
15. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 637 n.1 (1990) (citing to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1321); see also id. at 636-37 (describing role of PBGC with respect to defined benefit plans).
16. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004).
17. Deana Saxinger, Cash Balance Plans: They Work for Employers but Do They Work for Em-
ployees?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 345, 351 n.31 (2000). There is more variation for normal retirement
ages in public plans. James Poterba et al., Defined Contribution Plans, Defined Benefit Plans, and the
Accumulation of Retirement Wealth, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2062 (2007); see, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman,
Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 837, 856 n.78 (2009) (noting that the normal
retirement age for the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System is sixty-two but that certain law
enforcement officers can retire with twenty years of service).
18. BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08983t.pdf; Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension
Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1219 (2011).
19. Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 462.
20. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CHOOSING A RETIREMENT PLAN: DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN,
available at http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=1 08950,00.html.
21. Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 455. In some cases, defined contribution accounts are solely fund-
ed by the employees, while other plans can be designed to permit an employer to decide how much, if
any, it will contribute to an employee's retirement account each year. Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh
Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why Reform is Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employ-
ees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 307, 312 (2007).
22. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 4.
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guarantees an output. 23 As will be shown below, there are great difficulties
in guaranteeing a defined benefit's future output in changing economic and
political conditions. 24
Notable disparities exist between public and private sector retirement
plans. While an increasing number of private employers offer defined con-
tribution plans for their employees, 25 public employees are overwhelmingly
members of defined benefit plans. 26 In fact, as of 2007, forty-six states
required that new employees participate in defined benefit plans.27 Among
full-time employees, 98 percent of state and local government employees
participate in retirement or savings plan participation,28 with 91 percent of
them participating in defined benefit plans.29 As of 2005, however, only 60
percent of private sector full-time employees participated in retirement or
savings plans,30 with only 20 percent of those participating in defined bene-
fit plans.31
Defined benefit plans traditionally require larger cash injections from
employers, with one Bureau of Labor Statistics reporting that defined bene-
fit plans cost private companies $2.21 per hour on average, compared to
$0.27 for defined contribution plans. 32 The perception that government
23. Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 455.
24. See infra notes 71-133 and accompanying text.
25. CHARLES JESZECK, U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RETIREMENT INCOME:
CHALLENGES FOR ENSURING INCOME THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT 6 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0632r.pdf (as of 2007, 32 percent of households had a defined benefit
plan, and 38 percent had a defined-contribution plan). For the dangers of shifting the burden of retire-
ment plan administration from employers to employees, see William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indisci-
pline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 74, 79-84
(2010) and Henry H. Drummonds, The Aging of the Boomers and the Coming Crisis in America's
Changing Retirement and Elder Care Systems, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 267, 296-98 (2007).
26. Drummonds, supra note 25, at 282; see also BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 2-3 (as of
2007, forty-six states had defined benefit plans as their primary pension plans for general state workers,
two had defined contribution plans, and two had plans which combined both defined benefit and de-
fined contribution components); id. at 10 ("[E]ach of the [fifty] states has also established a defined
contribution plan as a supplementary, voluntary option for tax-deferred retirement savings for their
general state employees.").
27. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 9 fig. .
28. Drummonds, supra note 25, at 282.
29. Ron Snell, Lawmakers Spent the Past Five Years Shoring Up Public Retirement Plans,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (July/Aug. 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=20716.
30. Drummonds, supra note 25, at 282.
31. KATHERINE BARRETT ET AL., THE PEW CENT. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE:
PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS 11 Itbl. 1-3 (2007), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Statepolicy/pensionreport.pdf.
32. ALISON T. TOUHEY, FDIC OUTLOOK: THE SHIFT AWAY FROM DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS n.38
(2006), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro2006lq/na/2006_springO2.html; see
also Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1193-95
(2010) (noting that defined benefit plans, as opposed to defined contribution plans, require employer
contributions even after an employee has ceased employment).
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employees have a better retirement system than private sector employees
because of the disparity in their salaries is somewhat at odds with recent
data showing that state and local government employees have higher sala-
ries than those with comparable private sector jobs.33 Thus, in some areas,
public sector employees earn more money during their actual employment
than private sector workers and then have a more secure, employer-backed,
defined benefit pension plan waiting for them when they retire. According
to 2007 U.S. Labor Department data, state and local governments paid
$3.04 per hour towards each employee's retirement while private employ-
ers paid $0.92 per hour.34 The expense of defined benefit pension plans
will become even more apparent once the Baby Boomer generation begins
to retire.
B. Demographics ofBaby Boomers
The seventy-eight million "Baby Boomers," comprising those born
between 1946 and 1964, form one of the largest generations in U.S. histo-
ry-a generation equal to roughly 26 percent of the total U.S. population.35
These Baby Boomers are about to play a central part in one of the largest
problems the public and private pension funds in the United States have
ever seen. According to a study by the Urban Institute-a non-partisan
non-governmental organization-approximately 33 percent of all Baby
Boomers will be eligible to receive defined benefit pension plan benefits
upon retirement, 36 which equates to roughly twenty-six million eligible
retirees.
33. Laing, supra note 14 (noting that state and local employees earn an average $26.11 per hour,
versus $19.41 per hour for comparable private sector employees).
34. Ben Elgin & Chad Terhune, 'How Dare You Take My Pension' Heard as Cutbacks Loom
(Correct), BLOOMBERG, Oct. 20, 2010, 3:42 PM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-14/-how-
dare-you-take-my-pension-becomes-refrain-as-voters-consider-cutbacks.html.
35. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF BABY BOOMERS 42 To 60 YEARS
OLD IN 2006, at 2, 21 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/age/2006%2Baby/20Boomers.pdf.
36. KAREN E. SMITH ET AL., THE URBAN INST., FINAL REPORT: MODELING INCOME IN THE NEAR
TERM 5, at VIII-28 tbl.8-13 (2007), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411571 MINT5.pdf, see also BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL.,
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BABY BOOM GENERATION: RETIREMENT OF BABY BOOMERS IS
UNLIKELY TO PRECIPITATE DRAMATIC DECLINE IN MARKET RETURNS, BUT BROADER RISKS
THREATEN RETIREMENT SECURITY 2, 31-32 tbl.1 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06718.pdf (analyzing 2004 Survey of Consumer Finance data and
estimating that approximately 42 percent of baby boomer households are eligible for defined benefit
plans).
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The leading edge of the aging Baby Boomer generation recently hit re-
tirement age; the oldest turned sixty-two in 200837 and will be turning six-
ty-five in 2011. Due to the aging of this large generation, the average ratio
of active workers to beneficiaries in the United States will decrease from
3.3:1 in 2002 to 2.2:1 by 2030, with most of that change occurring after
2010.38 Those numbers are even worse when focused specifically on state
retirees, with a ratio of 2.02:1 in 2008 compared to 2.45:1 in 2001.39 Alt-
hough 12.97 percent of the population is over the age of sixty-five, that
number is projected to grow by roughly one and a half percentage points
every five years until 2035 when it will stabilize at around 20 percent.40
In light of these figures, it is probably not too surprising that life ex-
pectancy has increased dramatically in recent history.41 Indeed, James W.
Vaupel-director of the program on population, policy, and aging at Duke
University-has said that life expectancy in leading countries has increased
by three months every year for the past 160 years and believes that it will
continue to do so. 42 Because defined benefit plans continue paying benefits
to each retiree and his or her spouse until their deaths, a large influx of
retirees living longer than ever before will create a large strain on pension
plans' coffers.
Past economic recessions have come and gone, and although it is pos-
sible that the current global economic situation will improve sometime
soon, the United States cannot escape its aging population. In fact, some
economists even predict that the stock and bond markets will decline once
Baby Boomers start to withdraw money from their retirement accounts.43
37. John G. Kilgour, The Pension Plan Funding Debate and PPA of 2006, BENEFITS QUARTERLY,
Fourth Quarter 2007, at 7, 19.
38. June E. O'Neill, Why Social Security Needs Fundamental Reform, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 81
(2004).
39. Laing, supra note 14 (reporting data from the National Association of State Retirement Ad-
ministrators).
40. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROJECTED POPULATION BY
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND SEX FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2010 To 2050, at tbl.3, available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/files/nation/summary/np2008-t3.xls.
41. FELICITIE C. BELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., LIFE TABLES FOR THE UNITED
STATES SOCIAL SECURITY AREA 1900-2100, at 162-166 tbl.10 (2005), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf studies/studyl20.pdf.
42. Robert Pear, Social Security Underestimates Future Life Spans, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/31/politics/31benefit.html?r-I&pagewanted=all&position=.
43. Note that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) does not agree with this theory, but Alan
Gustman, professor at Dartmouth University, Thomas Steinmeier, professor at Texas Tech University,
and Michael Hurd of the Rand Corporation do not entirely agree with the CBO's analysis of this issue.




Although there may not be an en masse sale of all assets,44 the Baby
Boomers will shift from saving and investing to reducing their net assets as
they slowly withdraw and no longer add to their retirement accounts. 45 If
this prediction becomes reality, it will become increasingly harder for plan
managers to use investment gains to grow out of pension fund deficits.
II. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE RESULTING FINANCIAL
BURDENS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS
As noted above, defined benefit pension plans exist in both the public
and private sectors. However, the legal obligations that defined benefit
plans impose vary in different settings. The following sections examine the
different legal obligations in the two sectors and explore the magnitude of
the financial burdens that defined benefit plans are placing on employers.
Additionally, the following sections explore how and why pension plan
managers have failed to properly fund these large financial burdens.
A. Legal Obligations ofPublic Pension Plans
Public pension plans are legally protected by state constitution, state
statute, or contract.46 The majority of states have some form of constitu-
tional protection for their pensions. According to data compiled in 2000,
thirty-one states have a combined total of ninety-three constitutional provi-
sions protecting their pensions, and the other nineteen states have pension
protections either in their statutes or under common law.47 The strongest of
the constitutional provisions, which are in nine state constitutions, guaran-
tee participants in the retirement systems a contractual right to their bene-
fits and prohibit reducing or eliminating an accrued benefit.48 For example,
Alaska's Constitution states: "Membership in employee retirement systems
of the State or its political subdivisions shall constitute a contractual rela-
tionship. Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be diminished or im-
paired." 49
Even though not every state has a constitutional provision promising
contractual rights to pension plan participants, the majority of states view
44. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 36, at 16, 23 (stating that there is no big risk to market declines).
45. Powell, supra note 43.
46. GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 7.
47. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 12. For a thorough listing of state constitutional protec-
tions for public plans, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS (2007), available
at http://www.ncpers.org/Files/News/03152007RetireBenefitProtections.pdf.
48. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 13 tbl.1.
49. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7.
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public employees as having "certain contractual rights in a public pension
where the pension was part of the terms of employment."50 As some courts
have phrased it, "[a] public employee's pension constitutes an element of
compensation, and a vested contractual right to pension benefits accrues
upon acceptance of employment," 51 and "the contractual basis of a pension
right is the exchange of an employee's services for the pension right." 52
Another approach that some jurisdictions take is to view employees as
having property rights in pension funds, and thus protection under federal
and state due process provisions, instead of contractual rights with the gov-
ernmental employer.53
B. Legal Obligations ofPrivate Pension Plans: Protected by Federal
Regulation
In 1964, the wagon and automobile manufacturer Studebaker Compa-
ny's bankruptcy left its employees with only fifteen cents for each pension
dollar promised.54 In response to that bankruptcy and an increasing amount
of private pension plan abuses, Congress established the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 to safeguard private defined benefit pension
plans.55 ERISA does not require private companies to create defined bene-
fit plans, but once created the plans are regulated by ERISA and partially
insured by the PBGC.56 Thus, while companies that have created defined
benefit plans are contractually obligated to make payments to retirees, 57 the
PBGC provides an additional level of protection for employee benefits in
severely under-funded plans.
50. Laura Dietz et al., Pensions and Retirement Funds, 60A AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 1175, n.2
(2011) (citing cases from numerous jurisdictions); N.J. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 989 A.2d 282, 294 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 2010) (citing cases, statutes, and constitutions of states that view pension rights as contractu-
al).
51. Betts v. Board of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1978).
52. Claypool v. Wilson, 4 Cal. App. 4th 646, 662 (1992).
53. Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 810 (Conn. 1985) (Connecticut); N.J. Educ. Ass'n, 989
A.2d at 294 (New Jersey). For a discussion on contract and property rights for pension plans, see Ridge-
ley A. Scott, A Skunk at a Garden Party: Remedies for Participants in State and Local Pension Plans,
75 DENV. U. L. REV. 507, 518-22 (1998) and Andrew C. Mackenzie, Spiller v. State: Determining the
Nature ofPublic Employees'Rights to Their Pensions, 46 ME. L. REV. 355 (1994).
54. Adam E. Cearley, The PBGC: Why the Retiree's Traditional Life Raft Is Sinking and How to
Bail It Out, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 181, 182 (2006).
55. Id; Timothy R. Hurley, Hidden in Plain Sight-VEBAS: Shifting the Risks of Retirement
Benefits to Retirees, 45 TULSA L. REV. 495, 521 (2010) (quoting Professor David Gregory).
56. For example, ERISA requires that participating employers make minimum annual plan contri-
butions. Daniel J. Morse, et al., Involuntary Terminations of Pension Plans under ERISA Are Non-core
Matters, 36 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 75 (2006).
57. Crain, supra note 32, at 1193.
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The PBGC is a non-profit government corporation whose mission is to
protect the retirement incomes of more than forty-four million American
workers in more than 27,500 private sector defined benefit plans.58 The
PBGC receives its revenue from the following sources: insurance premi-
ums paid by employers that sponsor insured pension plans, investment
earnings, funds of pension plans the PBGC takes over, and recoveries of
plan sponsors' bankruptcy estates. 59 Importantly, 29 U.S.C. § 1302(g)(2)
states that the United States is "not liable for any obligation or liability
incurred by the corporation." 60
Under current law, the PBGC guarantees workers who retire at or
above age sixty-five up to $4500 per month.61 The vast majority-about 90
percent-of the participants in PBGC-trusted plans receive all of the bene-
fits their plan promised.62 The PBGC's latest figures indicate that it pays
the monthly retirement benefits, up to a maximum guaranteed amount that
is set by law, to almost 801,000 retirees in 4200 pension plans that have
ended. 63
The PBGC acquires terminated pension plans by three methods:
standard termination,64 distress termination,65 and involuntary termina-
58. Who We Are, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION,
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2010). Statutorily, the PBGC's Mission is:
1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of
their participants, 2) to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to partici-
pants and beneficiaries under plans to which this title applies, and 3) to maintain premiums established
by the corporation under [29 USCS § 1306] at the lowest level consistent with carrying out its obliga-
tions under this subchapter. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
59. Cearley, supra note 54, at 189; PBGC IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 5 n.6 (noting that
there is statutory authority to borrow up to $100 million from the Treasury Department, but that the
PBGC has only used that "line of credit" once, when it needed to cover its startup costs, and quickly
repaid the loan).
60. 29 U.S.C. §1302(g)(2) (2006).
61. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., MAXIMUM MONTHLY GUARANTEE TABLES (2010), available
at http://www.pbgc.gov/workers-retirees/benefits-information/content/page789.html.
62. PBGC IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 4-5 (noting that "[b]enefits for some participants may
be reduced if: 1) their benefits exceed PBGC's maximum guarantee limit, 2) a benefit increase occurred
(or became payable due to a plant shutdown) within five years of the plan's termination, or 3) a part of
their benefit is a supplemental benefit."); Kilgour, supra note 37, at 11 (those with generous pensions
above the maximum guaranteed by the PBGC will not receive their full benefits).
63. Who We Are, supra note 58.
64. Under a standard termination, a company with enough assets to pay off all of its obligations
voluntarily ends its defined benefit plan. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 638-
39(1990).
65. Either the PBGC or a bankruptcy judge can decide that a company can terminate its plan
because the company's continuing viability would be threatened by its pension obligations. John P.
Henry, A Fait Accompli for the PBGC and US Taxpayers: How the Last Hope for Redemption was
Missed in the 2005 Bankruptcy Code Revisions and Subsequent Court Decisions, 71 J. AIR L. & COM.
375, 379 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (2006).
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tion.66 A company can voluntarily terminate its defined benefit plan
through a standard termination if the company has enough assets to meet its
pension liabilities.67 A company can undergo a distress termination if the
PBGC or a bankruptcy judge decides that the company's continuing viabil-
ity would be threatened by its pension obligations. 68 Finally, the PBGC can
initiate an involuntary termination for a single-employer plan if the PBGC
determines that either the employer has not made its minimum required
contributions to the plan, the plan will not be able to pay benefits when
due, a large distribution to a corporate insider renders the plan underfund-
ed, or the PBGC's long-term costs can be expected to be unreasonably
higher if it does not terminate the plan.69 Because a standard termination
assumes a company has enough assets to meet its obligations, only distress
and involuntary terminations are relevant for this note.
C. Financial Burdens ofPublic Pension Plans
"Public pension promises are huge and, in many cases, funding is
woefully inadequate," Warren Buffett wrote in his 2007 letter to sharehold-
ers.70 "Because the fuse on this time bomb is long, politicians flinch from
inflicting tax pain, given that the problems will only become apparent long
after these officials have departed."71
1. The Current Financial State of Public Pension Plans
Nearly twenty million employees and over seven million retirees and
their survivors are covered by state and local government pension plans. 72
Typical asset allocation of public pension funds puts 60 percent of pension
plan assets in stocks, 30 percent in fixed income, 5 percent in real estate,
and the remaining in riskier investments, such as hedge funds or commodi-
ties, although allocations change with time and vary amongst different
pension funds.73 In the early 2000s, the funded ratio74 of 114 state and
66. The PBGC may initiate proceedings to terminate a single-employer plan where the PBGC
feels that the plan is not sustainable. Id. at 382.
67. Standard terminations generally do not impose financial burdens on the PBGC. Id at 378-79.
68. Id. at 379.
69. 29 U.S.C. 1342(a) (2006); 29 U.S.C. 1343(c)(7) (2006).
70. Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway, to Shareholders
(Feb. 2008), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20071tr.pdf.
71. Id.
72. GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 1.
73. David Evans, Hidden Pension Fiasco May Foment Another $1 Trillion Bailout, BLOOMBERG,
Mar. 3, 2009, 1:00 AM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alwTEOZ5.1EA. One example, the
Illinois Teachers' Retirement System, has an asset allocation of: 30.5% U.S. equities, 20.3% intema-
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local government pension plans was nearly 100 percent.75 However, one
recent study by Novy-Marx & Rauh looking at data from June 2009 esti-
mates that 116 major public pension plans sponsored by the fifty states
have about $1.89 trillion of assets to pay pension promises of between
$3.62 trillion and $5.28 trillion, leaving a gap of between $1.73 trillion and
$3.39 trillion. 76 The staggering implications of those pension liabilities are
highlighted when they are compared to the total state non-pension debt,
which was a much smaller $1.00 trillion as of 2008.77 The Novy-Marx &
Rauh study indicates that increasing the retirement age by one year would
only reduce pension liabilities by 2-4 percent, lowering COLAs by one
percentage point would reduce the liabilities by 9-11 percent, and imple-
menting actuarially fair early retirement would reduce them by 2-5 per-
cent.78 Even taking extreme action, such implementing Social Security
retirement age parameters or eliminating COLAs would still leave a deficit
of over $1.5 trillion.79 Yet making these adjustments might seem pointless
given the fact that about half of the states are setting aside less than their
yearly contribution amounts, essentially forcing future generations to pay
for the government services being performed today.80
tional equities, 17.5% fixed income, 9.6% real estate, 9.3% real return, 8.3% private equity, 3.6%
absolute return, and 0.9% short-term investments. Barry B. Burr, Another Illinois Plan Sells Invest-
ments to Cover Benefits, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Aug. 24, 2010, 3:38 PM,
http://www.pionline.com/article/20100824/DAILYREG/100829957; see also Browning, supra note 6
(state and local plans have 65 percent exposure to stocks).
74. "The funded ratio is the ratio of assets to liabilities." BARBARA D. BOVBJERG ET AL., U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREMENT BENEFITS: CURRENT
FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS 9 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08223.pdf.
75. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 19-20.
76. These figures are generated using the Entry Age Normal liability concept that most states use;
the range exists because of different discounting procedures. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh,
Policy Options for State Pensions Systems and Their Impact on Plan Liabilities 5, 7-10 (2010), availa-
ble at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6453.pdf (Working Paper No. 16453) (analyzing all state spon-
sored pension plans with over $1 billion in assets). Another study, using self-reported figures, estimated
the deficit for state and local governments was around $1 trillion, including health care and other re-
tirement benefits, before the severe investment declines in the second half of 2008. SUSAN K. URAHN
ET AL., THE PEW CENT. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDED STATE AND
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE ROADS To REFORM 3, 5 (2010), available at
http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates.org/TheTrillionDollar Gap final.pdf. Local government
pension plans suffer from similar problems. Dan Froomkin, 'Something's Got to Give': Massive Pen-
sion Fund Shortfalls Threaten to Bankrupt States, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 5, 2010, 7:06 PM,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/05/somethings-got-to-give-ma n_525860.html (stating that the
deficit for ten major Chicago-area public pension funds reached $18.5 billion in FY 2008, equivalent to
$5,821 for every Chicago resident).
77. These figures are from a different study by Novy-Marx & Rauh. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra
note 18, at 1237.
78. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 4, 16-7.
79. Id. at Abstract (using Treasury discounting).
80. Walsh, supra note 1.
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How did the states get into such a predicament? Often a combination
of political pressure leads elected officials to cut payments to a fund during
boom years, and a lack of political support to worsen a state's budget short-
fall prevents officials from increasing payments during a recession. 81 Dur-
ing the market boom and subsequent pension plan investment returns of the
1990s, many governments grew accustomed to easily making their Annual
Required Contributions (ARC), which are the actuarially calculated annual
contribution amount that would maintain or improve their funded status. 82
After this market boom, fund managers increasingly allocated their invest-
ments in equity. To illustrate, in 1990, only 38 percent of state and local
pension plan investments were in equities, while in 2007, 70 percent were
in equities.83
As fund managers were making a shift towards heavier investments in
equities, governments added benefits during rosy times, reduced retirement
ages, and shortened vesting periods, amongst other actions, perhaps think-
ing the 1990s boom would last forever. 84 Unfortunately, the dot-com bust,
the 9/11 tragedies, and the ensuing weakened economy during the early
2000s drove investment returns down.85 This subsequent decrease in fund-
ed ratios increased the amount that governments would have to contribute
out of their own pockets. 86 As recently as 2006, one GAO report found that
only 54 percent of state and local plans in its data set contributed 100 per-
cent of their ARC.87 The problem is further compounded because delaying
contributions is encouraged by accounting rules for state and local govern-
ments, which allow governments to use amortization periods of up to thirty
years to close funding gaps. 88
Another issue is that some contribution rates are fixed by constitution
or statute and do not change in response to changes in pension ARCs. 89
81. Froomkin, supra note 76.
82. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 74, at 8-9, 19; BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 22 n.39
("The ARC is made up of the amount of future benefits promised to plan participants that accumulated
in the current year, plus a portion of any unfunded liabilities. Although the ARC refers to the annual
required contribution, the use of the word 'required' can be misleading because governments can
choose to pay more or less than this amount.").
83. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 31, at 8.
84. See id.; Froomkin, supra note 76 (summarizing the causes of the current situation as
"[c]hronic underinvestment (particularly in the bubble years), poor management of assets before and
during the financial crisis, and, in some cases, unfunded benefit increases have put many pension funds
wildly out of balance.").
85. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 31, at 8.
86. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 74, at 19.
87. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 74, at 17, 18 fig.4.
88. Laing, supra note 14.
89. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 23.
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Even if a contribution rate is not fixed, it can take time for the legislative
process to react to economic conditions and increase contributions. 90 Addi-
tionally, some states may not be committed to pre-funding their pension
plans because the states place a higher priority on other initiatives.91 Yet
another recurring problem is that state and local governments often grant
large raises to an employee during his or her final year of employment to
boost his or her benefits. 92 Because employees' retirement benefits are
often based on the salary they earned in their last year, this "spiking" dra-
matically increases pension benefits.93 Finally, as explained below, ex-
pected rates of return can play an important role in public pension problems
because, if improperly set, these rates can hide the fact that a problem ex-
ists. 94
Additionally, state and local governments traditionally have a much
lower retirement age, which places more strain on a pension's funding re-
quirements. 95 Despite the fact that there is an oncoming bulge of Baby
Boomers who are going to live longer than previous generations, state and
local governments continue to allow retirements with full benefits at a
much younger age than the federal government or private employers.96 A
2005 study indicated that almost 98 percent of the plans studied offered full
retirement benefits at the age of sixty-two or earlier for employees with
long service. 97 It would appear that state employees take advantage of this
opportunity, as the average age of retirement is sixty.98
It might give residents of the United States some solace to realize that
they are not alone in facing this struggle. In twenty years, half of the West-
ern European population will be over fifty. 99 Europe spends one and a half
90. Id (noting that in spite of this problem, many states have been increasing their contribution
rates in recent years).
9 1. Id
92. Schwarzenegger, supra note 2.
93. Id; see also SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 17 (noting that although California passed legislation
to making spiking more difficult, loopholes in state law make pension spiking easy and legal (internal
quotations removed)).
94. See infra notes 106-124 and accompanying text.
95. BARRETT ET AL., supra note 31, at 12.
96. Id
97. Id (citing a Wisconsin Legislative Council study).
98. Neumann et al., supra note 7.
99. Kati Pohjanpalo, Europe's Pension Deficits May Provoke Investor Scorn, BLOOMBERG, Oct.
29, 2010, 10:43 AM, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-28/europe-s-pension-weakness-may-
draw-investor-scom-over-bloated-deficits.html (according to Professor Sarah Harper, Director of the
Oxford Institute of Ageing). In fact, while the United States percentage of population over sixty-five
will level off around 20 percent in the near future, Japan currently has 21 percent of its population over
sixty-five. Mariko Sanchanta & Megumi Fujikawa, Japan Weighs More Risk in Pension, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704858304575497171783208984.html
(noting that for FY ending June 30, 2009, the California Public Employees' Retirement Systems lost 23
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times as much as the United States on retirement, measured in terms of
Gross Domestic Product.100 Recent international news headlines note the
mounting debt, due in part to promised retirement benefits, in Ireland,
France, and Greece. 101 As one example, France's state pension plan is run-
ning an annual deficit of about $55 billion, roughly 1.7 percent of its
GDP.102 To combat this pension deficit, France's parliament recently
adopted legislation raising the minimum retirement age from sixty to sixty-
two and raising the age for full pension benefits from sixty-five to sixty-
seven. 103 The French government claims that raising retirement ages will
save the government 670 billion.104 In reaction to that two-year increase in
the retirement age, France's citizens have held at least eight national
strikes.10 5
2. Expected Rates of Return for Pension Funds as a Contributing
Factor
A pension plan's expected rate of return estimates how much the plan
will grow from its investments. An increase in a plan's liabilities in any
given year can be partially offset, or even surpassed, by the growth of the
plan's investments. Thus, a lower rate of return may lead plan administra-
tors to believe that outside funds (i.e., contributions) are necessary to main-
tain funding status.10 6 Conversely, a higher rate of return will lead plan
administrators to believe that smaller contributions are necessary to main-
tain the plan's funding status. Additionally, because government plans use
their expected return rate as their discount rate-the rate used to discount
percent of its value while Japan's more conservatively invested Government Pension Investment Fund
only lost 7.6 percent in FY ending March 31, 2009). Thus, it might be prudent for the United States to
pay attention to how Japan copes with its pension asset allocation in relation to its aging population.
100. Pohianpalo, supra note 99 (according to Standard and Poor's).
101. See, e.g., Fred Vettese, Is the Piggybank Broken?-Raising Retirement, FINANCIAL POST,
Nov. 25, 2010, 11:21 PM, http://opinion.financialpost.com/2010/11/25/is-the-piggybank-broken-
%E2%80%94-raising-retirement/.
102. Robert Marquand, As French Strikes Continue, Unions Take Aim at Sarkozy, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 13, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/1013/As-French-
strikes-continue-unions-take-aim-at-Sarkozy; Matthew Curtin, France is Euro Zone's New Front Line,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2010, 1:42 PM,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704361504575551813463485460.html.
103. Brian Love, French Unions Stage Last-stand Protest on Pensions, REUTERS, Nov. 6, 2010,
8:37 AM, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE6A502L20101106.
104. French Strikes Biggest So Far, Say Unions and Police, BBC, Oct. 12, 2010, 7:11 PM,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-l 1520220.
105. French Still Protesting Pension Reform, but in Smaller Numbers, CNNWORLD, Nov. 6, 2010,
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-06/world/france.strikesl _pension-reform-retirement-age-retirement-
law?_ s=PM:WORLD (eight protests as of Nov. 6, 2010).




future pension liabilities-and because lowering a discount rate can in-
crease a plan's obligations, public plans have yet another reason to hesitate
before cutting those rates.107 Thus, using high rates of return can hide pen-
sion shortfalls in a declining economy.
The reported expected rates of return for public pensions are relatively
high, particularly when compared with those rates of other private funds. 08
To illustrate, public pension funds often report expected rates of return
around of around 8 percent, though they can be as high as 8.75 percent.109
As a comparison, Warren Buffet has set Berkshire Hathaway Inc.'s pension
fund expected return of 6.9 percent." 0 Berkshire Hathaway uses a much
lower rate, yet it is a financially strong company that, as of 2009, had aver-
aged an annual growth in book value of 20.3 percent to its shareholders
since 1965.111
Not only can these hopefully high rates of return be an excuse for a
state to reduce the amount that the state has to contribute to a fund, but they
can induce a pension system to make questionable decisions. For example,
in 2008 the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA), which was under-funded by
62 percent and had not received a hoped-for contribution from the state of
Illinois, issued $1.9 billion worth of bonds with a 6.8 percent return.112 The
CTA had calculated that it could borrow $1.9 billion, paying an interest
rate of 6 percent to bondholders, and then invest those proceeds to receive
an expected rate of return of 8.75 percent. 113 Not only did the CTA end up
borrowing against a higher interest rate, it only earned 2 percent on the
cash for the first year after the bond sale. 114 As a result, instead of earning
107. Id. ("Funds use a so-called discount rate to estimate the size of future obligations to retirees,
and thus the contributions needed to fund them. Corporate plans use a discount rate based on corporate
bond yields. But government plans use their expected return rate on all investments as their discount
rate."). For a discussion on this topic with examples, see Josh Barro, The Teacher Pension Nightmare,
FORBES.COM, Apr. 14, 2010, 11:27 AM, http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/14/teacher-pension-education-
taxpayers-opinions-contributors-josh-barro.html.
108. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 13-14.
109. Evans, supra note 73.
110. Id.; see also SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 14 (stating that some financial advisors have suggest-
ed that an even lower rate may be more appropriate, such as 5 percent).
111. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, INC., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2009ar/2009ar.pdf.
112. Evans, supra note 73.
113. Id. (stating that the CTA's actuarial firm determined that there was just a 30 percent chance of
the CTA earning 8.75 percent).
114. Id.; see also Richard Riordan & Alexander Rubalcava, How Pensions Can Get Out of the Red,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/opinion/16riordan.html (stating that
Calpers, California's state pension fund, earned less than half of its even now assumed 7.75 percent rate
of return over the past decade).
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an expected $52 million in the first year, the CTA ended up losing $91
million. 115
New Jersey provides another example of the dangers of hopeful rates
of return. In 1997, the state sold $2.75 billion of bonds at an interest rate of
7.64 percent, attempting to cover an unfunded $4.25 billion pension liabil-
ity. 116 Then-Governor Christine Whitman stated that "[y]ou'd be crazy not
to have done this."ll 7 Unfortunately, as of early 2009, the pension fund has
earned an annualized 4.8 percent since the bond sale, resulting in a loss of
$500 million.' 18 Current Governor Chris Christie is now complaining that,
while private-sector unionized employees in New Jersey are experiencing
high rates of unemployment, they are still being asked to pay higher prop-
erty taxes to fund salary increases and free health care for public sector
employees.119
It is important to keep in mind that public pension plans posted a me-
dian, annualized return of 9.3 percent over the past twenty-five years.120
Unfortunately, over the past ten years, they have posted just a 3.9 percent
return.121 One problem with setting the expected rate of return so high is
that the annualized return of 9.3 percent, for example, was obtained by
taking investment risk.122 If risks materialize, such as those that led to the
recent 3.9 percent return over the past decade, then state taxpayers are on
the hook for any shortfalls.123 Even more problematic, when those risks
have yet to materialize it can be politically unwise for a plan to be over-
funded. Contributions made to over-funded systems can become a target
for lawmakers' other ambitions, or can even be used to increase retiree
benefits.124
115. ($1,900,000,000)*(0.0875-0.06) = $52,250,000 and ($1,900,000,000)*(0.02-0.068) -
$91,200,000.
116. Evans, supra note 73; National Problems, Local Solutions. Federalism at Work Before the H.
Comm. On Govt. Reform, 106th Cong. 14 (1999),
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/gro/hgo57470.000/hgo57470_0f.htm (statement of Christine T.
Whitman, Governor, New Jersey).
117. Evans, supra note 73.
118. Id.
119. Balz, supra note 3; see also Paul Ingrassia, Trillion-dollar Pension Crisis Looms Large over
America, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 2010,
http://www.iimagazine.com/article.aspx?articlelD=2442415 (describing Gov. Christie's statement that
one 49-year-old state retiree contributed only $124,000 towards his pension plan, but the state owes him
$3.3 million in pension payments and an additional $500,000 in retiree health care benefits).
120. Reilly, supra note 106 (according to Callan Associates).
121. Id. (according to Callan Associates).
122. See Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 8 (describing dangers of not including risk in rates
of return).
123. Id.
124. BOvBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 19.
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3. California as a Concrete Example of Pension-funding Problems 125
Looking at California is instructive of state pension-funding problems,
and Governor Schwarzenegger's recent Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, if
taken at face value, reveals the state's precarious position.126 California
currently has $550 billion of retirement debt, although that figure includes
retirement health care promises as well as pension promises.127 The cost of
servicing that debt has grown at an annual rate of more than 15 percent for
the past ten years.128 At this point, nearly eighty cents of every government
dollar goes to employee compensation and benefits.129 California effective-
ly guarantees $1 million to public employees who opt to retire at age fifty-
five, providing them with a monthly, inflation-protected check of $3000 for
the rest of their lives.130 Spending on California's state employees over the
past ten years rose at nearly three times the rate the state's revenue grew, at
the expense of, to name a few areas, higher education, environmental pro-
tection, and parks and recreation. 131 From just a pension point of view,
since 1999, California's public pension spending has increased 2000 per-
cent, but state revenues have only increased 24 percent.132 Even taking into
account proposed pension reforms, a decade from now retirement costs are
projected to increase from $6 billion in 2010 to nearly $30 billion per
year.133
D. Financial Burdens ofPrivate Pension Plans on the PBGC
Private sector pension funds are also struggling, as evidenced by the
increasing deficit of the PBGC.134 Because the PBGC is responsible for
guaranteeing retirement benefits to employees whose companies are too
under-funded, this Note will focus on the financial burden the private sec-
tor is facing from the viewpoint of the PBGC. The PBGC's 2009 annual
report states that the "breadth of business failures across sectors and re-
125. Of course, California is not the only state dealing with this problem. For examples from other
similarly situated states, see Ingrassia, supra note 119 (describing New Jersey and Connecticut's fund-
ing situations that resulted from poor decisions).
126. Schwarzenegger, supra note 2.
127. Id.
128. Id.




132. Ingrassia, supra note 119.
133. Schwarzenegger, supra note 2.
134. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: ANNUAL
REPORT 2009, at 3, 7 (2009), available at http://www.pbge.gov/docs/2009_annual report.pdf.
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gions in FY 2009 was unprecedented in PBGC's 35-year experience." 35
By the end of fiscal year 2009, the PBGC had become directly responsible
for almost 201,000 new participants, about nine times the 22,000 new par-
ticipants in plans taken during the fiscal year 2008.136 The new pension
obligations, combined with unfavorable changes in interest factors, almost
doubled the PBGC's deficit from $11.2 billion at the end of 2008 to $21.9
billion at the end of 2009.137 Moreover, the PBGC expects terminations to
continue well after the initial economic shock of the ongoing crisis.138 The
GAO has designated the PBGC's single-employer pension insurance pro-
gram as "high risk" since 2003,139 but the recent economic downturn and
the increase of a historic deficit surely puts the PBGC beyond "high risk".
Yet another cause for concern is the PBGC's newly adopted invest-
ment policy, which reduces the percentage of PBGC assets allocated to
fixed-income investments, increases the PGBC's proportional holdings in
international equities, and introduces new asset classes, such as private
equity, emerging market debt and equities, high-yield income, and private
real estate. 140 The goal of this change in policy is to reduce the current
deficit through greater returns. 14 1 Yet, as the Congressional Budget Office
points out, increasing the risk within the PBGC's asset allocation may also
increase the risk that the PBGC will not have sufficient assets to cover
employee benefit payments when the economy and financial markets are
weak.142
Finally, the PBGC is sometimes harmed by the very companies it as-
sists. When a company seeks bankruptcy protection,143 secured creditor
claims (claims to specific assets) will be satisfied from the assets of the
135. Id. at 3 ("PBGC trusteed the pension plans of household names in the finance (Lehman Broth-
ers, IndyMac Bank), retail (Circuit City), and telecommunications (Nortel) industries. The health care
industry was also hard-hit, with several hospital plans terminating. In the automotive industry, Delphi
Corporation's pension plans alone brought 70,000 new participants to PBGC's rolls.").
136. Id.
137. Id. at 3, 7 (resulting largely from the difference between $68.7 billion in assets and $89.8
billion in liabilities for PBGC's single employer program).
138. Id. at 3.
139. PBGC FINANCIAL, supra note 1, at Highlights (the GAO also expressed dismay that the PBGC
board had not met in fifteen months during a time of financial crisis).
140. Id. at 9.
141. PBGC IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 23.
142. PBGC FINANCIAL, supra note 1, at 9-10.
143. Note that companies entering bankruptcy can choose not to abandon their pension obligations.
General Motors, for example, recently entered and exited bankruptcy while retaining its pension obliga-
tions to the United Auto Workers union. JunoTrade, GM Has Not Learned Its Lesson, SEEKING ALPHA,
Nov. 29, 2010, http://seekingalpha.com/article/239014-gm-has-not-learned-its-lesson.
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company before unsecured creditors receive any asset allocation. 144 The
PBGC takes a back seat to these secured creditors, and indeed must strug-
gle even amongst other unsecured creditors for assets. 145 Companies filing
for chapter 11 bankruptcy often do so immediately before mandatory pay-
ments are due to the PBGC. For example, Northwest Airlines filed for
bankruptcy one day before a payment of $65 million was due to the PBGC,
essentially making the PBGC an unsecured creditor for that amount. 146 In
this way, companies entering bankruptcy can shift certain portions of their
pension obligations to the PBGC's balance sheet.
Although Congress has taken some action to help reduce the burden
on the PBGC, funding gaps remain a problem.147 For example, the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) were
intended, in part, to help deal with the PBGC's exposure to under-funded
pensions.148 The PPA allows companies seven years to fully fund their
pension promises.149 However, a recent GAO report states that the PPA did
not fully close potential funding gaps. 150 Moreover, the Worker, Retiree,
and Employer Recovery Act of 2008, intended to help pension plans
weather the current economic downturn, will result in lower plan contribu-
tions than employers would have had to make under the PPA.151 This tem-
porary reduction of contributions will likely increase the PBGC's risk
exposure. 152
III. BREACH OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS: TRADITIONAL
MECHANISMS INSUFFICIENT TO COMBAT PENSION UNDER-
FUNDING
Employees should be wary of assuming that their employers' legal ob-
ligations to fund pension plans will provide a sufficient mechanism to en-
sure employees receive their retirement benefits. State and local
governments currently fail to make sufficient contributions to plan funds,
144. Denise R. Polivy, Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11: A Comprehensive Compilation of
Current Case Law, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 220 (1998).
145. Henry, supra note 65, at 401-03 (discussing the difficulty the PBGC might have in getting a
lien against a debtor-company's assets).
146. Cearley, supra note 54, at 181.
147. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 134 and accompanying text.
148. Maria O'Brien Hylton, Together We Can: Imagining the Future of Employee Pensions, 12
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 383, 394 n.49 (2008).
149. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-legged Stool
ofSocial Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 MINN. L. REV. 938, 972 (2007).
150. PBGC IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 1, at 15.
151. PBGC FINANCIAL, supra note 1, at 9.
152. Id. at 9.
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yet the following sections demonstrate that forcing states and local gov-
ernments through the court system to make large enough contributions is a
futile exercise. Additionally, although the PBGC could dramatically in-
crease employer contributions to reduce its deficit, such action would have
potentially harmful effects on companies that are already suffering. Thus,
the size of pension-underfunding coupled with the current economic down-
turn threatens to leave employees with no viable traditional mechanism for
receiving their benefits.
A. Traditional Mechanisms for Under-funded Public Pension Plans
Unfortunately, many state and local plans currently face increased
benefit costs and insufficient employer contributions. 153 More recently, the
current economic downturn has had a more pronounced impact on state and
local pension plans, with plan managers reporting that in the short period
from June to December 2008 public sector pension plans lost nearly a quar-
ter of their asset value.154 Still, plans report that they have sufficient assets
to cover years of benefit payments. 155 The problem is that while these plans
may be able to make payments in the near future, they do so at the expense
of future generations who will either have to make higher contributions to
make up for the lack of contributions today, or receive smaller benefits.
At first glance, bankruptcy may seem like an appealing legal option
for overwhelming debt; unfortunately, municipalities are the only public
entities that can declare bankruptcy. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
deals exclusively with municipalities and provides them with the power to
restructure their debt and ease their burdens. 156 States, however, have no
safe harbor in which to rest should their debts become overwhelming.157
Therefore, unless states can gather sufficient funds, they may be forced to
default on their debts.
Outside of bankruptcy, an obvious traditional option for resolving the
problem of under-funded public pension plans is using the judicial system
to force states to contribute to their pension plans. In states that provide
153. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 22-23. Since ERISA does not apply to state pension
plans, they do not have the same minimum funding requirements that ERISA requires of private pen-
sion plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
154. GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, supra note 1, at Highlights.
155. Id.
156. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (2006). The largest municipality to ever file bankruptcy was Orange
County. Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE
J. ON REG. 351, 361 n.52 (2010).




contractual rights for employees' pension benefits, California and New
York for example, there has been some success in forcing governors and
legislators to appropriate the required amounts through lawsuit.15 s Howev-
er, a similar lawsuit failed in New Jersey, which views pension rights as
property rights.159
Considering that litigation may be successful in forcing a state to con-
tribute to its failing pension plans, the question that arises is, what will an
injunction forcing contributions accomplish? The old saying that "you can't
squeeze blood from a turnip" is apt. If, for example, a court were to order a
state to contribute $100 million to a troubled pension fund, the state would
have to get the $100 million either from new sources-such as bond sales
or raised taxes-or by taking money from other spending projects-such as
police or fire department funding. Unfortunately, a combination of the im-
minent Baby Boomer retiree influx and a stagnant or declining economy
may prevent states from being able to raise enough money through taxation
or bond sales 60 to continue funding their pension plans and providing nec-
essary services. Thus, alternate approaches beyond litigation should be the
proper approach to addressing this looming crisis.
B. Traditional Mechanisms for Under-funded Private Pension
Plansl6'
As discussed above, when private companies cannot meet their con-
tractual obligations to pay benefits to retirees, there is already a legislative-
ly created safeguard in the PBGC that offers protection for those retirees.
158. Walsh, supra note 1.
159. Id. In New Jersey Education Association v. State, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that
public school teachers did not have a constitutionally protected right to a particular method of funding
their pension plans. Moreover, the court held that the benefits the teachers had accrued for past service
were property interests, not contractual rights. While those property interests were non-forfeitable, the
teachers did not have a constitutional right to future appropriations for their pension plan. 989 A.2d 282,
294, 297-98 (2010).
160. Bond sales can be hampered by a lower credit rating. See, e.g., Moody's Cuts Calpine's Credit
Rating to Junk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/15/business/moody-s-
cuts-calpine-s-credit-rating-to-junk.html.
161. While beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that health care costs for retirees are
increasing. Walsh, supra note 1. While private defined benefit plans have required funding and have the
backing of the PBGC, Other Post Employment Benefits (OPEB) have no similar requirements or back-
ing. Howard Silverblatt, America's Other Pension Problem, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 19,
2005, http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/dec2005/pi20051219 9796_pi015.htm. Moreo-
ver, in the public arena, most states handle health care costs on a pay-as-you-go basis, as opposed to
setting aside money in advance. Walsh, supra note 1. According to a recent Pew Center report, no fewer
than twenty-one states have funded 0 percent of their retiree health care and non-pension benefits.
O'Grady, supra note I1. The GAO recently reported that state and local governments have under-
funded OPEB by at least $530 billion. Ingrassia, supra note 119 (noting that some estimates are as high
as $1 trillion).
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However, with the PBGC's increasing deficit, the private defined benefit
plan insurance agency may soon need its own form of insurance. To close
its historic deficit without resorting to federal aid,162 the PBGC has three
basic options: reducing the PBGC's benefit payments, increasing premiums
charged, and strengthening plan funding rules.163 In other words, the PBGC
could reduce the maximum payment amounts it guarantees retirees from
the current $4,500 a month, the PBGC could increase the rates it charges
private companies to remain insured by the PBGC, or the PBGC could
require private companies to contribute more to their plans.164
Reducing the PBGC's maximum guaranteed payment would place an
increased financial burden on retirees. Notably, however, the PBGC has
never reduced its maximum guaranteed payouts.165 Increasing private
companies' insurance premiums or requiring companies to contribute more
to their plans would place an increased financial burden on companies. Yet
already hurting private companies would suffer just as much from in-
creased PBGC premiums or contribution requirements as state and local
governments would suffer if courts forced those governments to increase
their pension fund contributions. In fact, the PBGC's own analysis reveals
that achieving even a 50 percent probability of eliminating PBGC's pro-
jected 2020 deficit through its traditional methods would require drastic
steps.166
IV. SOME ACTION ALREADY BEING TAKEN, AND SOME
POTENTIAL STEPS
Because under-funded pension obligations are of enormous propor-
tions, state and local governments, and to a lesser extent the PBGC, will
need to examine the many options available to address their funding defi-
162. Although ERISA states that the United States is not liable for any liability or obligation of the
PBGC, many commentators think this is a likely result given the fact that the PBGC is a federally
created corporation. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger, Looking Out for the Next Bailout, ECONOMIX, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2008, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/looking-out-for-the-next-
bailout/.
163. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 134, at 11.
164. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 61.
165. Id.
166. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 134, at II (considering hypothetical actions it
might take, the PBGC analysis revealed that "[t]o attain a 50 percent probability of eliminating PBGC's
projected 2020 deficit, the variable rate premium would need to be increased by 410 percent, from
$9.00 to $45.90, and the flat rate premium would need to increase by 210 percent, from $35.00 to
$106.75, on January 1, 2011. To attain the same effect through changes to PBGC's benefit payments,
payments to all participants already receiving or due benefits from PBGC and those yet to come from
future projected terminations would need to be reduced by 14 percent across the board. Lastly, eliminat-
ing the deficit solely through increases in required contributions and variable-rate premiums could be
achieved by increasing the plan liability measures for both of those calculations by 33 percent.").
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cits. The following sections look at the steps governments have already
taken to address their pension-related deficits. 167 Additionally, the follow-
ing sections discuss and evaluate some additional options public and pri-
vate pension systems have to combat potential disaster, and the
consequences of not taking steps to reduce pension liabilities. Finally, this
Part examines some steps the PBGC can take to prevent private companies'
pension plans from ever entering into the PBGC's control.
A. Options to Address Public Plan Under-funding
1. What States are Already Doing to Combat Pension Under-funding
Because there are no existing benefit obligations in place for future
employees, states are finding it easiest to reduce the benefits for future
employees. For example, New Jersey Governor Christie signed a law in
2010 that prevents future part-time employees from participating in the
state's defined benefit plan-instead requiring them to join a defined con-
tribution plan-and Governor Christie's new budget includes reforms par-
tially directed towards future public-sector employees.1 68 As another
illustration, Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell is supporting a bill which
would restructure pension benefits for public employees, although he ex-
pressed his regret that "the bad news is it can only be done for future em-
ployees." 69
Most states have followed the trend of reducing benefits for non-
vested employees. During the past fourteen years, Alaska, Michigan, and
the District of Columbia have eliminated defined benefit pension plans for
new employees and replaced them with defined contribution plans.170 Six
states, while still providing defined benefit plans as their primary plans for
general state employees, also offer defined contribution plans as optional
167. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 14 (describing actions implemented state by state,
including preventing spiking, increasing employee contributions, and increasing the length of time an
employee must work to be eligible); URAHN ET AL., supra note 76, at 8 (describing reforms taking place
as falling into five categories: "l) keeping up with funding requirements; 2) reducing benefits or in-
creasing the retirement age; 3) sharing the risk with employees; 4) increasing employee contributions;
and 5) improving governance and investment oversight."). For a broad overview of all states' actions
with graphs, see RON SNELL, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE RETIREMENT
LEGISLATION IN 2010, at 2-13 (2010), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/labor/SnellPensionsLegSum2OlO.pdf.
168. Bob Williams, New Jersey Governor Signs Pension Reform Bills, STATE BUDGET SOLUTION,
Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.statebudgetsolutions.org/blog/detaillnew-jersey-govemor-signs-pension-
reform-bills; Balz, supra note 3.
169. Balz, supra note 3.
170. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 2, 8; Existing State "401k" Plans: Michigan, Alaska &
Washington DC, 401K PLANNING, http://www.401kplanning.org/existing-state-401k-plans-michigan-
alaska-washinton-dc/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
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alternatives to their primary plans that employees can opt into. 171 Georgia
eliminated COLAs for new workers. 172 Rhode Island raised retirement ages
for all employees who are not yet eligible for pension benefits, while Iowa
raised the retirement ages for all non-vested employeeS.173 Vermont ap-
pears to be the only state that has implemented a system wherein benefits
are reduced for employees who retire before the normal retirement age such
that the present value of their benefits equals the present value of the bene-
fits they would have received had they started to collect them at the normal
retirement age-also known as assessing early retirement penalties on an
actuarial basis-although the Iowa Public Employees system doubled its
actuarial reductions to 6 percent per year.174
Some states, deciding that cutting benefits for future employers alone
will not be enough to save state pension systems, are attempting to cut ben-
efits for current employees and retirees. 175 For example, Colorado, Minne-
sota, and South Dakota (states without constitutional guarantees, but whose
pensions are protected by statutes and court cases) 176 have reduced their
COLAs, which affects both current and future plan members, although
these reductions are currently being challenged in court by pensioners.1 77
New Jersey Governor Christie is proposing legislation that would raise the
retirement age to sixty-five, indefinitely freeze COLAs, and roll back the 9
percent increase in benefits the New Jersey legislature approved in 2001.178
Certain states are taking more drastic measures. Governor
Schwarzenegger's pension reform goals for California include prohibiting
spiking, requiring employees to increase their pension contributions, re-
quiring transparency for the size and asset allocation of public pension
funds, and using reasonable expected rates of return on fund invest-
ments. 179 Certain Illinois public pension plans are selling their investments
171. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 8, 9 fig.1; see also Zelinsky, supra note 16, at 505 (point-
ing out that I.R.C. Section 457 supplementary defined contribution plans are available in some state and
local governments).
172. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 13 & n.7 (quoting from Georgia House Bill 452/ Act
82: "[L]imiting future liability of the systems by adjusting the retirement expectations of persons who
are newly employed is a regrettable but necessary step toward fiscal soundness.").
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id. at 4.
175. Stephen C. Fehr, States Test Whether Public Pension Benefits Given can be Taken Away,
STATELINE, Aug. 10, 2010, http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=504503 (discussing
action taken or being considered in California, Illinois, South Dakota, Minnesota, and Colorado).
176. Id.
177. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 13; Fehr, supra note 175 (noting that retirees in Colo-
rado claim that changes to COLA could cause the average retiree to lose more than $165,000 in benefits
over the next twenty years).
178. Dopp, supra note 12.
179. Schwarzenegger, supra note 2.
2012]1 225
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
to meet their pension benefit obligations because the state has fallen behind
in making payments to the funds. 80 However, this approach merely post-
pones funding issues, because without available investment capital, these
pension systems will not be able to participate in any market opportunities
that may exist, exacerbating future problems.181
The General Accounting Standards Board, the accounting board for
governments, will hopefully force states to publicly adjust their calcula-
tions to reflect more realistic expected returns. 182 However, some states are
already reducing the expected rate of investment return for their pension
systems, albeit by small decrements.183 According to a 2010 GAO report,
an estimated 60 percent of large and medium state and local plans antici-
pate changing their investment strategies in response to the current eco-
nomic downturn.184 Aside from borrowing to provide short-term funding
relief, state and local plans appear to have moved toward investing in high-
er-risk assets.'8 5 Although high-risk assets can be a proper part of a diversi-
fied portfolio, overweighting a fund with them increases the risk that poor
asset management will exacerbate recent market losses and require in-
creased employer contributions.186
Alicia Munnell, director of Boston College's Carroll School of Man-
agement's Center for Retirement Research, has stated that increasing the
retirement age is the single most important thing that states can do to lower
future pension costs because it reduces the number of years the state is
paying a benefit.187 Increasing retirement ages would also give states more
time to invest their pension funds before they have to pay out benefits. One
example of this thought being implemented is Illinois, where lawmakers
180. At least five Illinois defined benefit plans have had to sell off significant portions of their
assets. Burr, supra note 73.
181. "In the current market environment, there are significant market opportunities to institutional
investors with available capital. In the absence of the required contribution from the state, TRS and the
other Illinois pension systems will no longer be able to participate in these opportunities." Id. (quoting
public information officer David Urbanek).
182. Froomkin, supra note 76.
183. Reilly, supra note 106 (New York State Comptroller plans on reducing the state's pension
system's rate from 8 percent to 7.5 percent); id. (Virginia Retirement System cut its expected invest-
ment rate to 7 percent from 7.5 percent because "[t]here was a general thinking that equity markets
were unlikely to repeat the period of the 1990s.").
184. "These include pooling assets to pursue lower fees and higher quality managers, consolidating
the governance structures of multiple plans to improve accountability and transparency, and issuing
pension obligation bonds to overcome funding shortfalls." GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, supra note 1, at
Highlights.
185. Id at 33; but see Browning, supra note 6 (noting that private and public pension plans are
starting to reduce their exposure to the stock market).
186. The GAO doubts that many governments will be able to afford these required increased
contributions. GOVERNANCE PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 33.
187. Neumann et al., supra note 7.
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recently voted to increase the retirement age for most new hires from sixty
to sixty-seven.188 This change could help bring the average retirement age
for government workers-around sixty years old-closer to the average
retirement age of private sector workers-around sixty-three.189 Ideally,
pension plans would link retirement ages with life expectancy so that em-
ployees enjoying an increased lifespan bear the burden of retirement age-
adjustments.190
2. Additional Steps States Could Take to Combat Pension Under-
funding
Since much of the finger pointing is at the state legislatures, a re-
quirement that voters must approve any future government employee bene-
fit increases would both serve as a check against aggressive labor unions
and put the onus on the voters. 191 Voters will probably be hesitant to ap-
prove benefit increases they know come out of their pockets as taxpayers.
In California, voters in some municipalities amended their charters through
referendums to add this requirement,192 and similar changes could be made
to state constitutions. Voters in San Diego-one municipality with this
amendment-recently rejected a tax increase related to pension reform. 193
Similarly, states could benefit from encouraging state citizens, espe-
cially former state employees, to become a watchdog group making sure
pension plans are adequately funded. Eden Martin, of counsel at the law
firm of Sidley Austin and president of the Commercial Club of Chicago,
suggests that one way to cap excessively high benefit payouts would be to
adopt a PBGC-styled system such that if a pension plan is under-funded,
then retirees would get a reduced amount of their benefits, with early retir-
188. Utah is requiring new fire and public safety employees to work twenty-five years, up from
twenty years, before getting a full pension; Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, and Missouri are also mak-
ing changes. Id. New York also raised its normal retirement age from fifty-five to sixty-two. Ingrassia,
supra note 119.
189. Neumann et al., supra note 7.
190. Leigh Phillips, Increase Retirement Age as Life Expectancy Rises, Says European Commis-
sion, THE GUARDIAN, July 5, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jul/05/increase-
retirement-age-life-expectancy.
191. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that San Francisco, San Diego, and Orange County have
done this).
192. See, e.g., San Diego Charter, Article IX, § 143.1; Proposition B: City Employees' Retirement
Benefits: City of San Diego, SMART VOTER, Jan. 4, 2007, 9:40 AM,
http://www.smartvoter.org/2006/11/07/calsd/propB/ (describing San Diego's Charter Amendment vote
in 2006).




ees receiving greater reductions. 194 Employees would be encouraged to
work longer to avoid a possible early retirement penalty, and retirees would
certainly pay attention to plan funding if they knew their benefits could be
reduced in any given year.
State governments can also look to the United States' federal govern-
ment's decision to employ both a defined benefit plan and a supplementary
defined contribution plan, the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), for the Federal
Employees Retirement System (FERS).195 Federal employees who were
hired before 1984 are covered by the Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS), a solely defined benefit plan-although employees can now elect
to contribute to the TSP. 196 The Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
has estimated that the cost of CSRS is about 25.8 percent of employee pay,
with the federal government paying 18.8 percent of that amount, while the
FERS basic annuity is about 12.3 percent of employee pay, with the federal
government paying 93.5 percent of that amount. 197 The OPM estimates that
neither the CSRS nor FERS pose a danger of insolvency.198
The federal government could also play a role in encouraging states to
address their under-funded pensions. There are few ways for the federal
government to force sinking states to contribute the required amounts to
their pension systems, since ERISA expressly exempts government plans
from its purview.199 However, there is clearly a federal interest in making
sure that Americans have a secure retirement, as can be seen by the special
tax treatment provided for both private and public pension funds.200 Instead
of simply handing out cash to under-funded plans, Richard Riordan-
194. R. Eden Martin, Unfunded Public Pensions-the Next Quagmire, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704017904575409813223662860.html.
195. FERS Retirement, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
http://www.opm.gov/retire/pre/fers/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2011); Michael E. Murphy, Pension
Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-Regulation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 540 (2007).
196. CSRS Retirement, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
http://www.opm.gov/retire/pre/csrs/index.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2011); Federal Erroneous Retire-
ment Coverage Corrections Act, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
http://www.opm.gov/retire/pre/fercca/faq/general.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
197. Katelin P. Isaacs, Federal Employees' Retirement System: Benefits and Financing, ECONOMIC
LEGISLATION, Sept. 27, 2010, http://economic-legislation.blogspot.com/2010/09/federal-employees-
retirement-system.html ("There are three other employer costs for employees under FERS. Both the
employer and employee pay Social Security taxes equal to 6.2% of pay up to the maximum taxable
amount; agencies automatically contribute an amount equal to 1% of employee pay to the TSP; and
agencies make matching contributions to the TSP equal to up to 4% of pay.").
198. Katelin P. Isaacs, Federal Employees' Retirement System: Budget and Trust Fund Issues,
GOVERNMENT POLICY, Oct. 4, 2010, http://government-policy.blogspot.com/2010/10/federal-
employees-retirement-system.html.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) ("The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee
benefit plan if. . .such plan is a government plan.").
200. BOVBJERG ET AL., supra note 18, at Highlights.
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former mayor of Los Angeles and California Secretary of Education201 -
and Alexander Rubalcava-president of an investment advisory firm202 -
suggest that the federal government borrow a page from the Education
Department's Race for the Top initiative, which provides money to states
that propose significant reforms for their public school systems.203 Follow-
ing a similar tack, the federal government could grant tax-free, federally
guaranteed securities to states that cap their liabilities and adopt better
management practices. 204 If we assume, as many do,205 that the federal
government is the entity that would have to bail out state and local gov-
emments, this proactive approach would not add any more risk to federal
taxpayers, and it might give incentives to these governments to make nec-
essary changes.
3. Going Forward: Working Cooperatively to Reduce Pension Defi-
cits
As discussed above, successful litigation on the behalf of retirees
would force state and local governments with under-funded plans to con-
tribute funds they either do not have or could only raise painfully. 206 An
optimal solution, if all parties agree upfront that public pension systems
have liabilities dramatically exceeding their assets, would be to avoid liti-
gation and negotiate benefits down, increase pension contributions, reduce
plans' expected rates of return, increase the age of retirement in light of life
expectancy tables, and enforce actuarial reductions based on early retire-
ments. While it may be difficult to reach a consensus to enact every availa-
ble method of reducing pension liabilities, employees and governments
cannot afford to ignore all of these options. Voluntary action by both em-
ployers and employees aimed at reducing liabilities is the best way to retain
defined benefit pensions without raising taxes or issuing even more debt on
already indebted state and local governments.
201. Riordan & Rubalcava, supra note 114.
202. Id.
203. These authors also argue that while the growing number of retirees contributes to the current
problem, the real issue is that lack of incentive to improve pension performance. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.; see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. From one point of view, some states are
already expecting federal funds to assist their funding requirements. For example, at one point, North
Carolina's FY 2011 budget included a contingency plan to fill the $500 million gap that would be left
without federal funds, at least partially, by reducing contributions to the state retirement systems.
NICHOLAS JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF & ERICA WILLIAMS, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS (2010),
available at http://www.responsibletaxes.org/resources/an-update-on-state-budget-cuts/.
206. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
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Fortunately, there seems to be a growing consensus in the political,
business, and academic circles, as well as the media, that we must take
steps to decrease our pension liabilities.207 For some public plans, several
voluntary changes have already been made.208 In one example, the execu-
tive director of the public employee union American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees in Minnesota stated that his board was
accepting COLA reductions for current retirees so that "we don't kill the
goose that lays the golden egg." 209
Of all of the solutions discussed or being enacted, linking retirement
ages to average life expectancy and enforcing actuarial reductions based on
early retirements would have the added benefit of addressing the Baby
Boomer retirement wave. Just as COLAs can adjust for changing rates of
inflation in order to maintain and ensure a retiree's purchasing power, these
two modifications would: (1) adjust for changes in life expectancy to en-
sure equal treatment between generations, and (2) prevent retirees from
retiring early without penalties to ensure equal treatment within genera-
tions. Of course, these changes could benefit private plans as well and re-
duce future burdens on the PBGC.
While these two adjustments may not seem favorable to Baby Boom-
ers who planned on retiring at the same age their parents did, Baby Boom-
ers must keep in mind that their longer life spans would allow them to
enjoy their benefits far longer than their parents did. Additionally, these
modifications are not directed solely at Baby Boomers-they have the
great benefit of being long lasting changes that would continue to serve
their purpose for all future generations. After examining all of the methods
available to reduce pension plan liabilities, hopefully employees will be
willing to agree to these two initial steps, which are not as harsh as reduc-
ing benefits outright or increasing employee contributions. Yet, if the im-
mense size of pension under-funding is not enough to incentivize
employees to take some initial steps towards liability reduction, perhaps the
fear of unilateral state action will be.
207. See supra note I and accompanying text.
208. Jeannette Neumann, State Workers, Long Resistant, Accept Cuts in Pension Benefits, WALL
ST. J., June 29, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703279704575335153612628676.html (stating that
unions and workers' associations supported state legislatures voting to reduce benefits in six out of nine
states in 2010).
209. Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 76, at 14 n.5 (noting that this and other evidence seems to
indicate that some unions and public officials seem to understand that taxpayers are bankrolling gener-
ous retirement plans).
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4. The Danger of Not Acting Cooperatively: The Contract Clause
If state and local governments and their employees do not come to a
consensus on steps they can take together to reduce pension obligations and
corresponding government deficits, states may be forced to resort to chang-
ing pension contracts. Roughly half of the states either follow the federal
law concerning contract impairment or have a less stringent standard.210
For those states restricted by their contractual obligations to retirees, there
is the possibility of retroactively changing their pension plans.
Under United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the Su-
preme Court held that the Contract Clause in the Constitution does not
"prohibit the States from repealing or amending statutes generally, or from
enacting legislation with retroactive effects." 211 Although the Contract
Clause appears to proscribe "any" impairment, "the prohibition is not an
absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical
formula." 212 The Court in United States Trust went on to explain that legis-
lation that adjusts the rights and obligations of contracting parties must be
based upon "reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the
public purpose justifying its adoption." 213 However, in reviewing economic
and social regulation, courts should defer to the legislature's judgment as to
the necessity and reasonableness of a particular adjustment. 214
Two cases decided in the Fourth Circuit under the Contract Clause
with very different results are instructive. In Baltimore Teachers Union,
American Federation of Teachers Local 340 v. Mayor and City Council of
Balitmore, the court of appeals held that legislation requiring furloughs for
Baltimore teachers, which equated to a cut in a contractually agreed salary,
did not violate the Contract Clause. 215 The court reasoned that although
"[iun the employment context, there likely is no right both more central to
the contract's inducement and on the existence of which the parties more
especially rely, than the right to compensation at the contractually specified
level" the legislation reducing salaries was necessary and reasonable in
light of the City's problems.216
210. Brian A. Schar, Contract Clause Law Under State Constitutions: A Model for Heightened
Scrutiny, 1 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 123, 132-133 (1997).
211. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977).
212. Id. at 21 (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934)).
213. Id. at 22 (internal citations omitted).
214. Id. (internal citations omitted).
215. 6 F.3d 1012, 1018, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993).
216. Id. at 1018. "In light of the magnitude and timing of the proposed cuts in state funding that
prompted the City's salary reductions, the undisputed legitimacy of the City's need to balance its budg-
et, the City's concerted efforts to exhaust numerous alternative courses of cost reduction before resort-
ing to the challenged reductions, the circumscribed nature of the furlough plan, and the City's
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Three years later in Andrews v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland, a
district court held that legislation retroactively reducing earned retirement
benefits did violate the Contract Clause. 217 The court, keeping Baltimore
Teachers Union in mind, stated that "[t]he diminution of pension benefits is
more likely than not an even more substantial impairment than a diminu-
tion of annual salary because the individual receiving pension benefits is
typically already living on a reduced income as compared to her pre-
retirement earnings." 218 Because the severity of the contract impairment
measures the height of the hurdle the legislature must clear, the court con-
cluded that the County Council had not pursued enough alternative options,
such as issuing pension liability funding bonds, or demonstrated that those
alternatives were not as worthwhile or feasible to make this impairment
reasonable. 219
One of the key differences between these two cases was the level of
the economic crisis. The court in Andrews noted that courts have typically
upheld extreme modifications only in the face of emergency or temporary
situations. 220 Thus the emergency situation present in Baltimore Teachers
Union, which, according to the City, "was approaching the point where it
[had] to begin cutting basic services and initiating the breakdown of gov-
ernment," merited an extreme modification to a contract.221 The defendant
county government in Andrews, however, admitted that the county was not
in a state of emergency.222
As has been pointed out throughout this Note, the challenges that local
and state governments face could soon rise to the level of an emergency,
requiring so much to be spent on pension benefits that these governments
will begin cutting basic services. Alternatively, and just as disastrously,
these governments may find that they cannot honor both their pension and
bond obligations. Should that happen, retirees may find themselves wishing
that they had renegotiated their pension benefits instead of having states
unilaterally alter them.
immediate abandonment of the reductions at the first opportunity, we believe-according the legislature
some deference but without accepting its assertions uncritically-that Baltimore's plan was, as it must be,
'upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption.'
United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22, 97 S.Ct. at 1518. Accordingly, we conclude that the City's modifi-
cation of its employees' contracts was an impairment permitted by article 1, section 10." Id. at 1022.
217. Andrews v. Anne Arundel Cnty., Md., 931 F.Supp. 1255, 1267 (4th Cir. 1996).
218. Id. at 1265 (emphasis in original).
219. Id. at 1266-7; Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 1997 WL 33544352, Nos. 96-2463(L) 96-
2465 (Cross-Appeal), at *32-33 (Jan. 7, 1997) (list of suggested alternatives).
220. Andrews, 931 F. Supp. at 1266.
221. Baltimore, 6 F.3d at 1021.
222. Andrews, 931 F.Supp. at 1266.
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As one example of what can happen if state legislators wait until it is
too late for other options, state legislators-as well as private businesses-
can look to the Greek legislature's recent austerity measures. To combat its
debt-laden pension system, Greece's retirement age will no longer be fixed
at sixty-five for men and sixty for women, but will be linked to the average
life expectancy. 223 Additionally, Greece increased the minimum number of
working years required to qualify for a full pension from thirty-seven to
forty years. 224 Pensions were also reduced to prevent spiking so that they
now reflect a worker's average working pay rather than his or her final
salary. 225 Greece implemented these measures in return for a E 110 billion
bailout package from the E.U. 226 U.S. state and local governments, howev-
er, may not be able to get such a sweet deal. Rather than forcing such an
austerity measure through in such a short time and risking public upris-
ing,227 state and local governments should view Greece's legislation as a
wake-up call to take action soon.
B. Private Plans: Keeping Companies Out of the PBGC
Private defined benefit plans already have more oversight than their
public counterparts because they are regulated under ERISA.228 Not only
does ERISA require private companies to make minimum annual contribu-
tions to their pension funds-something lacking in some public funds-it
also provides the PBGC as a protective shield for private plans. 229 Howev-
er, as noted above, the traditional methods the PBGC has to reduce its defi-
cit could hurt companies that are already suffering. 230
Policy-makers and the PBGC should focus, then, on assisting private
companies so that the companies never need to seek shelter in the PBGC's
protective umbrella. Recent proposed legislation would extend the number
of years a private company had to fully fund its plan to nine (from the sev-
223. Greece's Austerity Measures, BBC, May 5, 2010, 11:50AM,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10099143; see also Greece: List of New Austerity Measures, LIVING,
WORKING, MUSING & MISADVENTURES IN GREECE, http://livingingreece.gr/2010/05/02/greece-new-
austerity-measures/ (last updated July 31, 2011) (stating that link to life expectancy will begin in 2020).
224. Greece: List ofNew Austerity Measures, supra note 223.
225. Id.; Greece's Austerity Measures, supra note 223.
226. Greece: List ofNew Austerity Measures, supra note 223.
227. Greece's Austerity Measures, supra note 223; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text
regarding France's public protests.
228. While private companies could, on their own initiative, implement the options discussed
above, supra notes 168-209, the focus of this section is on the PBGC.
229. Morse, et al., supra note 56.
230. Supra notes 162-166.
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en currently required by the PPA).231 Under this extension employers
would only have to make token payments for the first two years.232 The bill
would allow employers up to fifteen years to fully fund their plans in ex-
change for a promise not to freeze benefits. 233 This, of course, would in-
crease the amount of money the PBGC would have to pay out if private
companies' pension plans eventually fail.
Additionally, a recent case provides an example of how the PBGC
may take direct action to prevent having to take control of some plans. In
Adams v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia allowed the PBGC to enter into an
agreement with the chairman of Trans World Airlines (TWA) whereby the
chairman agreed to fund TWA's pension liabilities in exchange for limiting
his liability should the PBGC eventually take over TWA's plans.234 Thus,
instead of immediately terminating the financially troubled TWA's pension
plans, the PBGC tried to craft a plan to continue their existence. While this
ended poorly for TWA employees when the plans were eventually termi-
nated at the request of the chairman, the Court held that PBGC had the
statutory authority to broker such deals.235 The District Court reasoned that
under 29 U.S.C. § 1367, the PBGC has the power to "make arrangements
with [plan] sponsors and members of their controlled groups who are or
may become liable under [the statute] for payment of their liability." 236
Depending on the economic environment and potential investor/suitors, this
kind of deal brokering could be an extremely useful way for PBGC to
avoid increasing its liabilities. At the very least, the PBGC might be able to
entice interested parties to take chances on companies that have good busi-
ness models but were simply overpowered by a strong economic downturn.
231. Javier C. Hernandez, Bill Would Extend Time to Fund Pension Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/business/30pension.html (quoting Senator Michael B. Enzi,
R-WY as saying, "[i]f we could have foreseen in 2006 the steep stock market decline coming around




234. 332 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2004). For a discussion of this case, see Henry, supra
note 65, at 393-394.
235. Adams, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 233, 236. Recall that one of the goals of the PBGC is to "encourage
the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their participants.
29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006).
236. Adams, 332 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (citing Allied Pilots Ass'n v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 334
F.3d 93,98-9 (D.C.Cir.2003) (emphasis in original).
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CONCLUSION
The sheer amount of America's public and private under-funded pen-
sion liabilities is staggering. As with most serious problems, the sooner we
deal with our under-funded liabilities, the better. For the private sector,
while private defined benefit plans are already insured by the PBGC, this
Note has suggested a proactive approach by the PBGC to prevent troubled
companies' pension plans from having to fall under the control of the
PBGC. For the public sector, in the hope that readers will recognize that
litigation, where possible, is not the best way to address public defined
benefit pension fund shortfalls, this Note has touched on several steps poli-
cy-makers can take to improve pension fund shortfalls. Of these steps, an
approach that establishes a link between employee age and pension benefits
is fair and has the added benefit of alleviating the pressure that will be
caused by the Baby Boomer retirement bulge.
The steps we need to take to address pension funding shortfalls will
almost certainly be painful, especially for those employees who must deal
with the changes mid-career or post-retirement. However, this short-term
pain will be much better than a future in which debt-defaults look more and
more likely. If we do not choose to take serious steps to reduce our pension
liabilities now, we may find ourselves backed into a corner in which French
or Greek-like austerity measures, and the discord those measures brought
with them, are the only options to avoid defaulting on debt and sliding into
another financial crisis.237
237. As mentioned above, there has been a concurrent recent increase in benefits promised and a
decrease in pension funding that has contributed to this crisis. As businesses and policy-makers discuss
the proper steps to address the nation's under-funded pensions, they would be prudent to 1) evaluate
how much of this debt could be eliminated simply by lowering benefits back to levels seen in the 1980s
or 1990s-retirees would probably be more comfortable with a decrease in benefits that was explained
as equating their benefits with recent retirees'-and 2) assess exactly how much pension debt might be
alleviated by market growth-especially considering that pension funds are heavily weighted towards
stocks.
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